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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOROTHY STEVENSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
VERNON L. STEVE.NSON, 
Defendant .a'nd Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9529 
ST·ATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit for divorce on the grounds of mental 
cruelty, and for alimony, and for distribution of the 
marital estate. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER C01'RT 
The trial court found that plaintiff had failed to 
prove n1ental cruelty and denied her a divorce. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order of this court reversing the 
judg1nent of the trial court, and ordering the trial court 
to enter a decree of divorce in her favor, and to u1ake 
an equitable distribution of the property of the parties 
and to grant her such alimony as is fair and reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this brief we shall refer to the parties as they 
appeared in the court below. Since this case is equitable 
in nature, and the facts should be reviewed by the Court, 
we set forth the evidence in some detail. 
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment of the 
District Court denying her relief in her suit against 
defendant for divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty. 
In this brief we shall refer to the parties as they ap-
peared in the court below. Since this case is equitable in 
nature, and the facts should be reviewed by the Court, 
we set forth the evidence in some detail. 
The testimony of the plaintiff on her case in chief, 
may he smnmarized as follows: 
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Plaintiff and defendant were rnarried at Newport, 
Washington, on January 11, 1935. (R. 25). Two children, 
both of whon1 had reached adulthood at the time of trial, 
were born as issue of the n1arriage. (R. 26). From the 
very inception of the 1narriage there were difficulties. 
On the second night of their marriage, defendant asked 
plaintiff for a divorce, and she slept on the couch that 
night. (R. 27). He told her that she was not a lady. 
From that time he repeatedly thereafter, throughout the 
course of their marriage, suggested divorce. (R. 27). 
Over the course of their married life, defendant re-
quired plaintiff to perform all types of menial services 
for him, notwithstanding that he was an eminently suc-
cessful physician with a good income. For example, the 
plaintiff had the responsibility of reaming out and 
cleaning his pipe. (R. 35). When they went on trips she 
was required to pack his suitcase and have it ready at 
the door. (R. 35). She was required to take his clothes 
to the cleaner, maintain the garden, and maintain the 
plumbing. (R. 35). She was required to handle all of 
the telephone calls, including calls at all hours of the 
night, although the telephone was on defendant's side 
of the bed. (R. 36-37). When it was necessary for the 
defendant to get up in the night to go on calls, he re-
quired her to get out of bed, move her car out of the 
driveway and open the garage door so that he could 
drive his car out. (R. 37). Throughout their marriage, 
he compared her unfavorably to other women. (R. 37). 
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At one time during their rnarried life when plaintiff 
was suffering fr01n a herniated intervertebral disc, he 
required her to perform all of her household duties in 
the usual manner. She was at this tirne in such pain that 
she had to push a chair around to get around the house. 
(R. 38). This was corroborated by her daughter, Mar-
jorie, who also testified that her mother had no rnedi-
cation for relief of pain. (R. 224, 226). 
She was required to perforn1 complete valet service 
for hin1, including the drawing of his baths, even at 4:30 
in the morning. (R. 38). She was also required to go 
downstairs to get him drinks of water at night. (R. 38). 
At one tirne when they were moving to a new home, 
defendant sat in a white shirt and tie and watched plain-
tiff perform all of the work without stirring a muscle to 
assist her. (R. 39). 
Plaintiff had c01nplete responsibility for the main-
tenance of the yard and the swimming pooL (R. 40). 
She also had ahnost cornplete responsibility for the 
rearing, education and religious training of the children. 
Defendant's only contribution to their education was 
paying for it. Their 24-year-old son had never been bap-
tized in any church and defendant never went to church, 
nor did he ever take the children to church. He forbade 
her to take the children to the church of her choice. (R. 
42-43). 
Defendant required plaintiff to bring his lunch to 
hirn at the office three or four tiines a week even though it 
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necessitated her leaving bridge luncheons or other social 
engagernents. (R. -±±). On one occasion, he required her 
to leave a swinuning party at her home, at which she 
was the hostess, to conre down to his office and adjust 
the lawnmower. (R. 45). 
The rnarital problerns becanre acute about January 
of 1959, following a dinner party, at which they had a 
spat. He again told her to seek a divorce, and she deter-
urined to do so. He then said "Dorothy, I am sorry, I 
didn't realize you were paranoid." (R. 28). At this time 
she moved out of his bedro.om and the parties never 
thereafter shared the same sleeping quarters. (R. 30). 
From January through J nne the situation was very 
tense and unpleasant. There were numerous talks about 
their family problems, in all of which, the doctor laid the 
entire blame on her, telling her it was her fault and that 
she should take stock. He admitted no faults whatso-
ever. (R. 29). He also blamed the difficulties onto both 
her mental and physical condition. (R. 30). At v:arious 
times he stated that she was paranoid, and he told Dr. 
Branch that his wife was going through the change and 
that she was responsible for all of their difficulties, and 
he was not. (R. 29-30, 62) 
In May or J nne of that year, plaintiff consulted 
legal counsel for the first time. In June she determined 
to leave the home, leaving a note under his pillow. (R. 
31). She went to Claremont, California, where her 
daughter was going to school. Her husband and son 
followed her immediately and persuaded her to come 
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hmne. At this time the defendant admitted that he was 
at fault in the marriage, and he agreed to change his 
ways if she would come horne, and try to work things 
out. He agreed to be nwre generous with her in financial 
matters, and to provide her with better clothes. He 
agreed to go to church with her on Sunday, and to come 
home for dinner at a specified time. She remained in 
the family horne fron1 June through September, attempt-
ing to work matters out, and it didn't work out. Defen-
dant refused to perform any of his agreements, and not 
only did not come horne for dinner as agreed, but com-
plained at the quality of the meals (which had been on 
the stove for three or four hours) when he finally did 
come home. (R.32-33). 
Whenever plaintiff made any complaints to defen-
dant, his reply was "you were the one that left.'' Plain-
tiff becmne extre1nely bitter, and for the first time got 
to the fish-wife level. There were n1any bitter arguments 
during this period. Defendant again refused to accept 
any responsibility for the n1arital difficulty. (R. 33). 
Whenever plaintiff Inade complaints he charged her with 
being paranoid. (R. 62). Plaintiff suggested marriage 
counselling, but defendant refused to go. Plaintiff finally 
went to see Dr. C. Hardin Branch, to see if there wasany 
truth to defendant's repeated assertions of paranoia. 
She consulted with Bishop Watson of the Episcopal 
Church, both individually and with 1nembers of the 
family group. (R. 3-±). Finally plaintiff permanently 
removed from the home in Septmnher. (R. 35). At 
about this time defendant threatened suicide (R. 48). 
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AI though plain tiff could not bear to ren1ain longer 
in the family hOine, she did not innnediately seek a di-
vorce. She yielded to the importuning of her husband 
and son, and agreed to a series of consultations with 
Dr. Brown, a psychologist and marriage counsellor. She 
had 22 hours of counselling over a six month period, 
tenninating in July of 1960. (R. 48-49). Defendant also 
received counselling during this period of time, but 
nothing concrete was acemnplished toward salvaging the 
1narriage. At one point when plaintiff was about ready 
to return to the home, and did go back for an evening to 
attend a party celebrating the engagement of her son, 
her husband delivered to her an ultimatum, either to get 
a divorce or nwve back. (R. 49). This was the last 
straw, and in June of 1960, she finally filed for divorce. 
( R. 1-3). In October of 1960, he told her that he "hated" 
her (R. 47), and that any feeling he ever had for her 
was dead. He also told her at this time that his family 
considered her to be "low". (R. 48). 
During the interim between the filing of the divorce 
and the time of trial, defendant continued to lay all of 
the blame at her doorstep, and to charge her with para-
noia and other 1nental disorders. On her own initiative, 
she sought further analysis from Dr. Branch and at this 
time she also saw Dr. Ija Korner, a psychologist. (R. 
54). 
The case first came on for pretrial before Judge 
Jeppson in December of 1960. No stenographic notes 
were kept of the pretrial proceedings, but it is apparent 
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from the letter of Dr. Branch to Judge Jeppson, which 
appears in the record at page 6, that Dr. Stevenson was 
still contending that his wife was n1entally unstable and 
that this was the root of the rnarital difficulty. Dr. 
Branch's letter also clearly indicates that there was no 
evidence whatsoever to indicate that Mrs. Stevenson was 
mentally ill or that she was reacting inappropriately to 
her present situation. (R. 6). Judge Jeppson subse-
quently disqualified himself from further hearing the 
case, and it came on for pretrial before Judge Van Cott 
in January, 1961. (R. 7). Defendant persisted in his 
claim that plaintiff was in need of psychiatric care and 
persuaded the court to order both parties to submit them-
selves to a further series of psychiatric or psychological 
consultations by psychiatrists or psychologists, to be 
mutually selected by counsel. (R. 7). In response to 
this order, plaintiff underwent a series of consultations 
with Dr. Craig Nelson, psychiatrist. ( R. 54). After the 
completion of this consultation, Dr. Nelson also drew 
the opinion that plaintiff was entirely mentally sound; 
that her decision to seek a divorce was rational and 
appropriate; that the granting of a divorce would be 
beneficial to her rnental health, and that a denial of a 
divorce would have an adverse effect. (Ex. P-3). 
Plaintiff's separation fron1 her husband had a bene-
ficial effect on her health. She gained 20 pounds from 
the time of separation to the tilne of trial. (R. 50). In 
view of all of the foregoing, plaintiff was of the opinion 
at trial, that reconciliation or resun1ption of the rnarital 
relationship was utterly impossible. (R. 55). 
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Plaintiff also called in support of her case Dr. 
William Brown, a clinical psychologist, who had been 
active in the clinical psychology field since 1934. In 
1950 he acquired a Ph.D degree in that field, and from 
1950 to 1959 he was clinical psychologist and instructor 
at the University of Utah in the departrnent of psychi-
atry. He was characterized by Dr. Ija N. Korner, Ph.D, 
as one of the ''most competent" people in the western 
states, (R. 181), and his qualifications were also en-
dorsed by Dr. Nelson, M.D. (R. 202). At the request of 
Dr. N. F. Hicken, a mutual friend of the parties, Dr. 
Brown agreed to consult with them in an .effort to assist 
them in their marital difficulties. (R. 79-80). 
It was understood at the outset that he would con-
sult with both parties for the purpose of helping them 
both better to understand themselves, and if possible, 
bring about a rnarital reconciliation. The ultimate goal 
of the consultations was a reconciliation. (R. 80). 
Dr. Brown saw the plaintiff on 14 separate occasions 
for a total consultation period of 24 hours, over a period 
of six months, commencing January 5, 1960. Initially 
the plaintiff was very tense. (R. 81). However, as the 
consultations proceeded, plaintiff became more self 
understanding and made progress. (R. 82). Although 
the defendant was cooperative in keeping appointments, 
it was more difficult for him to do some self looking and 
understanding. Throughout the course of the consulta-
tions, plaintiff remained fast to the idea that she did not 
want to rernain in the marriage situation. However, 
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there were occasions "during this period of ti1ne, she 
n1ight have entertained trying the 1uarriage again, but 
felt she got no indication of a similar intent frmn Dr. 
Stevenson." (R. 83). 
Dr. Brown was of the opinion that defendant's high 
pressure to rmnain Inarried was an obstacle in the way 
of the whole relationship and defeated the very purposes 
he was trying to accomplish. (R. 84). 
Plaintiff cmnmunicated freely to Dr. Brown. He 
found no evidence whatsoever during tlris series of con-
sultations that plaintiff's decision was influenced by any 
abnormal or emotional condition (R. 84). It was his 
opinion that there was no possibility of a marital recon-
ciliation. (R. 87). 
In cross-examining Dr. Brown, defendant persisted 
in the same attempts as he had throughout the course of 
the pretrial and trial proceedings, to show that plaintiff 
had a mental illness, which was the basis of the marital 
difficulty. On voir dire examination, counsel for defen-
dant, inferentially at least~ attempted to show that plain-
tiff had psychiatric problems which the witness was not 
cmnpetent to analyze, or to express an opinion con-
cerning. (R. 85-86). 
A considerable portion of the cross-exrunination was 
devoted to attempting to secure an admission from Dr. 
Brown that plaintiff had smne mental illness, and that 
he had expressed such a view to defendant and defen-
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dant's counsel on the occasion of a two-hour interview in 
July of 1960. However, the witness steadfastly main-
tained that plaintiff did not need further treatment. (R. 
88). With reference to the two-hour conference between 
the witness and the defendant and his attorney, Dr. 
Brown testified "the bulk of the two hours was [def,en-
dant] trying to i1npress the point Mrs .. Stevenson was 
sick. I resisted strongly." This testimony was substan-
tially reiterated on redirect examination. (R. 95). 
Throughout the interview Dr Brown contended that 
plaintiff was not sick. (R. 96). 
It was normal for her to have tensions due to the 
stress of her marital difficulties. (R. 96). In Dr. Brown's 
opinion plaintiff could have functioned adequately with-
out the help of his consultations, but the consultations 
did have a beneficial effect upon her in helping her to 
relax from all her tension. (R. 97). 
Dr. Stevenson was called as a witness for the plain-
tiff, principally on the issue of his earning capacity and 
the estate which had been built up by the parties. (R. 
99). Dr. Stevenson admitted that plaintiff had had the 
full responsibility of the household and of the rearing of 
the children. (R. 113). He likewise admitted that her 
efforts had contributed equally with his own in building 
up the estate. 
Upon this evidence the plaintiff rested her case in 
chief. (R. 115). 
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The only witness to testify upon defendant's behalf 
\\'a~ defendant hi1nself. Except for a few minor points, 
defendant did not undertake to refute specifically the 
testimony of the plaintiff. As to Inany 1natters of which 
plaintiff con1plained, defendant testified rather disdain-
fully that he had no recollection of the1n. Alnong these 
were a quarrel on the second night of their marriage, 
(R. 118) ; the incident of requiring her to c01ne to the 
clinic to repair a lawn Inower, (R. 124); her disc injury, 
(R. 126); and probleins in connection with the cleaning 
and maintenance of the swinnning pooL (R'. 134). Other 
portions of her testi1nony he apparently atte1npted to 
deny inferentially without Ineeting the issues squarely, 
siinply by testifying in so1ne detail that the marriage 
had been an entirely happy one, at least until about three 
years prior to the ti1ne of trial. (R. 120 to 125). He did 
ad1nit however, that on a trip to 1fazatlan, l\fexico, 
about three years prior to the trial, he noted that plain-
tiff was antagonistic toward hi1n, and that their marriage 
had been unsatsifactory since that tiine. (R. 126-7). 
Although this unsatisfactory situation existed, he 
claimed to have no notion that plaintiff conte1nplated 
leaving him in June of 1959. (R. 128). Almost innnedi-
ately upon discovering her note, he and his son left for 
Los Angeles by autonwbile, and plaintiff was persuaded 
b~" the son to return ho1ne "and see what we can work 
out." ( R. 129) . Ad1ni ttedly plain tiff's agree1nen t to re-
turn to the ho1ne wa8 on that basis, that is, to see what 
could be worked out. However, after her return h01ne, 
difficulties in the 1narital relationship increased. Defen-
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dant repeatedly suggested, ·'Let's do son1ething about 
it," but this Inet only with increased hostility. (R. 129). 
Defendant admitted no fault whatsoever on his part 
for the breakdown in the Inatrimonial relationship, ex-
cept that he spent too 1nuch time in his profession and 
not as 1nuch time as he should have with his family. (R. 
135, 152, 156). Although admitting this fault with one 
breath, in the next, he placed the 1najor responsibility 
for the Inarital breakdown on plaintiff's mental and emo-
tional state. In fact the real thrust of his defense was 
that the matriuwnial situation broke down solely as a 
result of her 111ental and e1notional problems. He ex-
pressed the view that she had involutional melancholia 
of the :Menopause. (R. 130, 139). He wanted to get for 
her "more adequate" psycho-therapy. (R. 131). During 
the summer that she returned home, he made every effort 
to get medical care for plaintiff. (R. 136). He thought 
medical treatment would solve the divorce problem. (R. 
141). He arrogantly took the view that in consulting with 
Dr. Brown, his primary purpose was to aid Dr. Brown 
and that any benefits to him were purely secondary. (R. 
151). In other words, she alone needed the treatments 
or consultations. 
On cross-examination he admitted that he never went 
to church with the plaintiff after the first year after 
their return to Salt Lake, except services in connection 
with his daughter's attendance at Rowland Hall School 
for Girls. (R. 144). He admitted that he agreed to make 
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concessions to plaintiff, and to confonn to her desires 
upon her agreement to return to the rnatrimonial domi-
cile from Los Angeles. However, when he was asked to 
nmne the concessions he rnade, he persistently evaded 
the questions. (R. 149-150). Apparently his only effort 
was to offer to get rnedical help for her, again placing 
the entire fault at plaintiff's feet and not doing anything 
to correct his own faults. Perhaps his attitude is best 
exernplified by the following excerpt fr·orn his testirnony: 
"~Irs. Stevenson rnoved to another roorn, which de-
pressed me, and I rnoved my car amd she never moved a 
car in that interval which was ,my way of showing I 
wanted to .do something in her behalf.n (Emphasis ours.) 
(R. 150). In other "Words, although he had agreed to 
change his habits upon her agreen1ent to return home, 
the only concession which he actually rnade was that he 
no longer required her to get up in the nriddle of the 
night to move her car, so that he could drive out. This 
was his way of showing that he wanted to do something 
for her. This was his rnagnificent concession to her-
his noble effort to salvage the n1arriage. 
He admitted that he had n1ade a telephone call to 
her in which he told her he had no feeling for her. (R. 
158), and he admitted that he had threatened suicide. (R. 
160). .He also adrnitted that he had told both the children 
and other rnernbers of the fanrily, and tire Hickens, that 
the plaintiff had an ernotional problem "that was more 
than superficial." (1~. 160). He also adrnitted writing an 
undated note to plaintiff wherein he a<hnitted "not being 
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a good husband." (Ex. P-1). tTpon this testimony defen-
dant rested. 
The plaintiff was recalled by the court and asked 
by hiin what fault she would admit in the marital break-
up. She answered candidly that she did not believe that 
anyone was guiltless, and that she felt that her basic fault 
was in yielding to all of the defendant's demands, and in 
not insisting on a certain liberty for herself. The court 
chose to interpret this as a claim by her that her only 
fault was in not correcting defendant's faults. (R. 166). 
Since the defendant based his defense largely upon 
the claim that plaintiff was suffering from a mental and 
emotional difficulty, which was the cause of the marital 
difficulty, plaintiff called as rebuttal witnesses Dr. Ija 
N. Korner and Dr. Craig Nelson, to testify as to plain-
tiff's complete rationality and good mental health. Dr. 
Korner is a clinical psychologist, holding the chair of 
Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Utah, 
where he has been employed since 1949. He does clinical, 
diagnostic, and therapeutic work. Plaintiff was referred 
to him by Dr. C. Hardin Branch for evaluation in Sep-
tember of 1960. (R. 167-168). 
The purpose of Dr. Korner's examination was to 
determine whether plaintiff's desire for a divorce was 
pathological or irrational. He saw the plaintiff three 
_times. He detern1ined as a result of his tests and examin-
ations that she was not mentally ill and was not neurotic. 
She was upset, which was a normal and proper reaction 
to the stress she was under. (R. 169). 
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Dr. Craig Nelson, a practicing psychiatrist, was ap-
pointed by the court to exarnine plaintiff professionally 
as a re·sult of the pretrial order requiring both parties 
to subrnit to psychiatric or psychological consultations. 
He had 12, fifty rninute interviews with plaintiff. It is in 
accordance with the best psychiatric practice to lirnit 
consultations to periods of not to exceed one hour per 
day. (R. 192-19-±). Plaintiff cooperated with the doctor 
completely. There was excellent con1rnunication both 
ways. After the first interview he was satisfied that 
there was no question of any serious mental illness. There 
was no psychosis. Originally her fear of her husband was 
excessive and somewhat unreasonable, but later became 
dinrinished as she knew herself better. (R. 195). 
He stated that in his opinion she was very healthy 
enwtionally and mentally; there was no evidence of 
any psychosis, and no evidence of any neurosis to the 
degree of being disturbed. Any neurosis was within nor-
rnal lin1its of behavior. Plaintiff benefited from her 
series of consultations with him, which was, in itself, evi-
dence of the good state of her mental health. (R. 196). 
Dr. Nelson saw no evidence of any deep seated prob-
lern. He did not think the plaintiff needed any further 
psycho-therapy. In his opinion, divorce would be bene-
ficial to her. Her decision to seek a divorce was one well 
thought out and considered at all levels. (R. 197). On 
the other hand, denial or postponen1ent of a divorce 
would place further stress on the plaintiff and intensi-
fy her sense of depression. (R. 198). 
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B~· ero~H-exmnination, eounsel for the defendant per-
Risted in his attmnpts to establish a Inental problem in 
the plaintiff. 1-Iowever, Dr. Nelson insisted that the 
anxiety which plaintiff had was appropriate to the situ-
ation in which she was. (R. 204). The 12 hours of con-
sultation which she had was sufficient to enable her to 
understand herself. (R. 205). Plaintiff did not have 
involutional Inelancholia. (R. 207). Although counsel for 
defendant sought to open up the subject of paranoia, the 
court properly sustained objections to that line of in-
quiry (R. 210). 
On redirect exan1ination, Dr. Nelson stated that 
there were many elen1ents in plaintiff's decision to seek 
a divorce, and that they were not neurotic. (R. 211). 
Further counselling or psycho-therapy would not prob-
ably change plaintiff's attitude toward her husband or 
her marriage. ( R. 212). He reiterated that there was no 
evidence of involutional melancholia in the plaintiff. (R. 
217). 
Plaintiff also called as a rebuttal witness her 
daughter Marjorie, age 20 (R. 219). She testified that 
she had first noticed difficulty between her parents when 
she was about 10 years of age. (R. 219). She noticed 
that her mother becan1e increasingly more tense, as did 
the witness. A general feeling of tension continued to 
build up over the years. (R. 220). Defendant told the 
witness that her mother had a mental problem. (R. 221). 
He also told her that her mother was sick and that the 
questions propounded by her counsel on defendant's de-
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position were ''depraved." (R. 223). She also corrobor-
ated her mother's testimony as to the difficulty she had 
had with her hack, and that she had to walk with the aid 
of a chair, and that defendant refused to give her any 
assistance at that time. (R. 224, 226). She characterized 
her father's repeated demands for psychiatric and psy-
chological consultations for her mother as being ''bad-
gered." (R. 2.29). 
With respect to her own relationship with defendant, 
she stated that he refused to help her with her personal 
problems, or to talk over problems with her. (R. 230-31). 
Plaintiff was also recalled as a rebuttal witness. She 
testified that she was at the time of trial still having reg-
ular menstrual periods. (R. 233). She went to Dr. 
Branch and requested a complete mental evaluation. (R. 
2·34). This was her own idea and not that of her counsel, 
which she undertook to be prepared to meet the repeated 
assertions of her husband that she was mentally or 
emotionally disturbed. (Record page unnumbered; Re-
porter's T'ranscript p. 219). Plaintiff testified to other 
events in their married life which had caused her dis-
tress, refuting defendant's testin1ony that everything was 
"rosy'' until two or three years prior to the divorce 
hearing . 
.A few months after their marriage, defendant was 
hospitalized for an appendectomy. During the course of 
his confine1nent he developed a urinary infection, as a 
result of which he accused his wife of infidelity, and 
giving him a venereal infection. They took a delayed 
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wedding trip, but did not live together because of his 
infection. It ·was subsequently determined that the in-
fection was not a venereal disease at all. (R. 235). How-
ever, defendant never so rnuch as apologized to her for 
his false accusation. (R. 236). 
Plaintiff also testified that the physical relationship 
of the parties had been wholly unsatisfactory during 
their entire rnarriage. Defendant blarned this on her, as 
· being unresponsive. He said that her attitude could lead 
to infidelity or divorce. At that time, she felt that she 
was at fault, and because of that she was willing to per-
form all of the rnenial services he demanded of her, in 
order to rnake up for her lack in the physical sphere of 
their rnarriage. Not until she had her consultations with 
Dr. Nelson did she finally realize that it was not her 
fault. (R. 216). The sexual act was physically painful 
to her. This was because defendant made no "build-up." 
(R 237). 
On one occasion in their early married years, defen-
dant physically kicked the· plaintiff out of bed. On 
another occasion, he left her alone in the woods on a 
dark night while driving her home from a party. (R. 
237-238). 
Plaintiff consulted with an attorney in April or 
May of 19'59. During that sumrner she consulted with 
Bishop Watson of the Episcopal Church, her religious 
adviser. She consulted with Dr. Brown from January 
through June of 1960. These consultations all took place 
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prior to the time that her divorce action was filed. (R. 
238). 
Defendant was recalled as a sur-rebuttal witness, 
and he denied the testimony of plaintiff as to the specific 
acts in their early married life of which she testified in 
her rebuttal testimony. On this evidence both sides 
rested. 
In summary, the evidence shows without serious dis-
pute, that whatever the situation was in the early years 
of marriage, the matrimonial relationship had deterior-
ated to a point of mutual hostility and antagonism at 
least two or three years before the time of the di~orce 
trial. There is no dispute that after this time the mar-
riage was wholly unsatisfactory to both parties, and had 
become completely intolerable to plaintiff. Defendant 
testified that during this period of time plaintiff was de-
pressed, melancholy and hostile. She testified that dur-
ing this period of time, he repeatedly charged her with 
being mentally or emotionally disturbed, and refused to 
accept any of the blame for the difficulty in the Inar-
riage; and although promising to change his ways, re-
fused to do so, or to satisfy her con1plaints. Feelings of 
tension increased rapidly and in June of 1959 plaintiff 
left the home not intending to return, because she could 
no longer endure residing in the same home with defen-
dant. However, she yielded to the persuasions of her 
son and husband, and did return for another three 
rnonths in an attempt to work out the marital problems, 
but the situation only becarne worse. She finally left the 
home in September of 1959. 
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l~ven when she left at that tirne she did not irnnledi-
ately file for divoree. In fact she did not file until nearly 
a year later. In the rneanwhile, she had the benefit of 
religious, rnedical, psychological, rnarital, and legal 
counselling. 1-ier decision to file for divorce certainly 
·was not precipitate, and she had extensive counselling 
before the action was filed. 
It was approxirnately nine nwnths from the time 
the action was filed, until the trial. During this period 
of time she had further consultations with Dr. Branch 
and Dr. I{orner, and a series of consultations with Dr. 
Nelson. She was nervous, "run-down" and fearful while 
living with her husband. She regained weight and men-
tal tranquility while separated from him. Dr. Nelson 
testified that her health would be benefited by a divorce 
and would be jeopardized by the denial or postponement 
of a divorce. All of the experts who were called, agreed 
that further marital consultations were not indicated and 
would not be beneficial. 
Plaintiff contends that the evidence overwhelmingly 
established mental cruelty on the part of defendant in 
at least two lines of conduct : 
1. That defendant persistently demanded of plain-
tiff a large measure of menial personal service. Although 
he denied some of her testimony, he sinrply claimed to 
have no recollection as to other portions, and as to still 
other portions, he admitted the acts performed, but 
claimed that pla1ntlff d1d thetn out of love and a:Hectlori 
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for him. That Inay have been his interpretation, but it 
clearly was not hers, and certainly after the last trip to 
Mexico, he could not have been unaware of her attitude. 
However, instead of attempting to change his ways he 
persisted in essentially the same course of conduct, jus-
tifying it with the oft-repeated assertion that she was 
mentally ill, and that the problem could be solved by 
psychiatric consultation for her. 
2. Defendant persisted in charging plaintiff with 
various mental and emotional disturbances, with being 
paranoid, and with having involutional melancholia, 
through the last two or three years of their marriage. 
It is possible that originally he might have in good faith 
believed that there was an emotional or mental disorde.r. 
However, after four entirely independent and well quali-
fied experts, (two of whon1 plaintiff had no voice whatso-
ever, in selecting), examined plaintiff and found her to 
be entirely mentally and emotionally sound, a claim of 
good faith in reasserting such charges is not tenable. On 
the contrary, the charges of mental and emotional in-
stability are revealed for what they truly are, an attempt 
by the defendant to avoid personal responsibility for his 
own Inisconduct in the n1arriage, and throw the blame 
on her. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE RELIED UPON 
1. THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT #4 IS UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
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2. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IS UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, AND IS AGAINST LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT #4 IS UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IS UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO THE 
WEIGHT OF 'THE EVIDENCE, AND IS AGAINST LAW. 
This being an action equitable in nature, the evidence 
1nay and should be reviewed and weighed by this court. 
Griaziano v. Gra.ziano) 7 U.2d 187, 321 P2d 931. We are 
confident that such a review by this court, will satisfy it, 
that the o;verwheln1ing weight of the evidence established, 
at the very least, that during the last two or three years 
of their marriage defendant engaged in a course of con-
duct which was extremely cruel to plaintiff, which had 
an adverse effect both on her physical and 1nental health 
to the extent that she could no longer endure to continue 
the marital relationship; and which entitled her to a 
divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. It may be per-
tinent to note here, that the term "rnental cruelty'' does 
not lend itself to a comprehensive definition. Each case 
must be examined on its own facts and a determination 
made as to whether the particular course of conduct 
proved amounts to mental cruelty. 17 Am. Jur. 285-6. 
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It is true that the type of cruelty practiced by defen-
dant upon the plaintiff was of a very subtle type. This, 
however, did not make it any the less painful to the vic-
tirn. In fact cruelty of this type rnay wound rnore 
severely than blows. It n1ay also be true that defendant 
did not act rnaliciously, and that at least for a tirue, he 
rnay have been insensitive to the effect his conduct \Yas 
producing on his wife. This again, is imrnaterial, since 
acts of cruelty are adjudged not by the intent of the 
doer, but the effect they have upon the victirn. 17 .Arn. 
Jur., Divorce and Separation, §47. 
There was a time when the courts required physical 
brutality in order to establish grounds for divorce on 
the ground of cruelty. That view has long since becOine 
passe'. The rnodern and enlightened view is discussed by 
Keezer in Marriage and Divorce, in a ehapter devoted 
to this particular subject. The fpllowing quotations are 
relevant here : 
At page 410, Sec. 335, the author quotes with ap-
proval from Dickinson v. Dickinson, 54 Ind. App. 53, 102 
NE 389, as follows: 
" ... the more rnodern and better eonsidered 
cases hold that any unwarranted and unjustifiable 
conduct on the part of either the husband or the 
wife which causes the other spouse to endure suf-
fer,ing and distress to such a degree as to wholly 
destroy; p~ace of miJnd, arv.d) 'IYnOtke: li,fe with ;such· 
,spouse unbearable, a~nd which completely destroys 
the real purpose and objects of matrimony, con-
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~titute ;;uch treatrnent as will justify the granting 
of a decree of divorce on the ground of extreme 
eruelt:· although no physical acts of cruelty have 
been inflicted. "I (Emphasis ours.) 
At page 412, he says : 
"By the weight of authority, physical injury 
or the threat thereof is not essential. l\fental 
cruelty, i1'bdiffer .. ence, ill temper, scolding, neglect, 
a contemptuous attitude and sirnilar conduct may 
be sufficient. It is difficult if not in1possible to 
lay down what amount of insults or of offensive 
conduct on the part of the husband or wife apart 
from acts of physical violence will amount to 
cruelty." (Emphasis ours.)· 
At page 415: 
"The acts of cruelty are to be judged by the 
effect produced without regard to the 1notives of 
the guilty party. It is not necessary that the acts 
of alleged cruelty shall be malicious. Inasmuch 
as the effect of acts done is an important element 
in the offense, the character of the parties, their 
positions in society, their sensibilities and actual 
physical relations to external stimuli, mental 
1nakeup and the like are all a part of the facts and 
circurnstances to be presented to the tribunal 
passing on the ultimate question of cruelty. Acts 
inflicted upon or treatment administered to cer-
tain individuals might, because of social standing 
or peculiar mental makeup drive such persons to 
actual insanity; yet the same acts or treatment 
might be the cause of only hilarious amusement to 
others .... It may also be that in a particular case 
one line of conduct is not of itself sufficient as a 
cause for divorce, yet numerous of such lines of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
conduct all taken together, may constitute legal 
cruelty, and it is the duty of the court to consider 
all these circumstances." 
In See. 359, page 422, the smne author says: 
''As to what constitutes treatment endanger-
ing health, there is a broader, modern doctrine 
being established. Aside from the acts of personal 
violence and bodily injury, there is a tendency to 
hold that there may be such conduct on the part of 
the defendant which, while it does not come under 
those heads, from its general effect on the mental 
and nervous temperament of the victim, produces 
a consequent injury to the health and tends to 
shorten life, and is therefore considered a species 
of cruelty." 
See also page 423 : 
"In determining these cases there is also a 
tendency to take into consideration the station in 
life, habits, training and refinement of the parties, 
and what might be. cruelty to a person of refin&-
ment would not be to one of grosser sensibilities.'' 
See also page 427, Sec. 363 : 
"The tendency of the modern decisions, re-
flecting the advanced civilization of the present 
age is to view marriage from a different stand-
point than as a mere physical relation. It is now 
more wisely regarded as a union affecting the 
mental and spiritual lives of the parties· to it, a 
relation intended to bring them the comfort and 
felicities of home life, and between whmn, in order 
to fulfill such design, there should exist n1utual 
sentiments of love and respect. 'It was fonnerly 
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thought that to constitute extrmne cruelty such 
as would authorize the granting of a divorce, 
physical violence is necessary; but the modern 
and better considered cases have repudiated this 
doctrine as taking too low and sensual a view of 
the marriage relation, and it is now very generally 
held that any runjustiNable C011Aduct on the part of 
either the husband or \Vife, which so grieviously 
wounds the feelings of the: other, or so utterly de-
stroys the peace of mind of the other, as to seri-
ously i1npair the health, constitutes extreme 
cruelty.' " (Emphasis ours.) 
At page 428, the author says : 
"The degree of Inental suffering required to 
be shown in these cases varies with the decisions 
on the different forms of the statutes. It is gen-
erally well settled, though, that such mental suf-
fering as will impair the health as a matter of 
fact, if shown by the evidence in the particular 
case as due to the cruelty of the defendant, will be 
sufficient. 111 ental suffering may be, and often i·s, 
far greater than physical, and the tendency of the 
courts is to regard uncalled for torture, 
naggimg and false accusations, where wantonly 
inflicted, if .sufficient in degree to inju,re health or 
endanger reason, as cruelty and a ground' for di-
vorce. In ... Utah . it is direct cause f'or di-
vorce, and in many of the states conduct making 
life unbea.rable and causing great mental suffer-
ing is sufficient in itself. This cruelty may consist 
in habitttal unkimdness of the defenodant spouse." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
The foregoing rules are recognized and restated in 
substantially similar language in 17 Ain. J ur. pp. 285 et 
. seq., Divorce and Separation,§§ 47, et seq. 
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The court n1ay consider acts which occulTed after 
separation as constituting sufficient cruelty as to justify 
a divorce. 17 Am. J ur., Divorce and Separation, Sec. 
55. False charges of insanity or Inental deficiency, con-
sidered in connection with other acts, justify a divorce 
for cruelty. 17 Arn. J ur. 303, Divorce and Separation, Sec. 
69. 
Although the case of Hildebrand v. Hildebrand) 
(Okla.), 137 P. 711, is wholly dissimilar on its facts, and 
we do not claim it as persuasive authority here, the 
following quotation fron1 that opinion is singularly 
appropriate: 
''Blows often wound less deeply than words, 
and in this age of Christian civilization when the 
wife is not as a beast of the field but instead the 
queen of the hon1e she is entitled of right to the 
husband's unfaltering love and respect and where 
this is denied her, where there is sufficient evi-
dence, to the protection of the courts. We find 
little patience with the insistence of the once semi-
barbaric rule that afforded an avenue of escape 
to the injured wife only where physical violence 
was inflicted upon her." 
The court's nor:mally assu1ne that the wife is nwre 
sensitive than the husband, and therefore in cases based 
on mental cruelty, less aggravated acts Inay ,,~en consti-
tue cruelty to the wife than would have to be sho\\Tn if 
the plaintiff was the husband. 17 Ant. Jur., Divorce and 
Separation, Sec. 49. 
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The decisions of this court are in full accord with 
the authorities above cited and quoted. In the early case 
of Doe v. Doe -±8 Utah 200, 158 P. 781, thjs court said: 
"The adjudged cases show that courts, on the 
ground of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much 
less evidence than they do the husband. That 
rests on sound principles for acts and conduct on 
the part of a husband may well constitute cruelty 
to the wife causing her great mental distress, 
when sirnilar acts and conduct on her part may 
not constitute cruelty to him, or cause him great 
rnental distress." 
The rnost recent pronouncements of this court fully 
reflect the views of Keezer above quoted. 
In Hendricks v. Hendricks) 123 Ut. 178, 257 P.2d 
366, this court said: 
"Frorn everything that appears in the in-
stant case, no good pwrpose) e;ither social) moral) 
ethical or legal could be served by refusing to 
grant a divorce and settle the property rights of 
the parties. It would be but a mockery of the 
true concept of matrimony to thus purport to 
compel the:se two people) clearly ill-suited and 
maladjusted to each other to contimue to ret,ain 
the legal relationship of husba;n,d and wife. 
"In view of the fact that neither spouse is 
accused of the commission of a felony, adultery or 
any other heinous offense, hut the reciprocal 
claims rest upon various acts and omissions 
alleged to constitute cruelty to the other, the trial 
co~~trt would best perform i·ts function in the ad-
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ministr,ation of justice by determining which 
party was least at fault, grant~ng a ;divorce and 
adjusting their rights, giving due consideration 
to the applicable factors outlined in our recent 
opinion of Jl!IcDonald v. McDonald." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U. 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977, this 
court said: 
"When it appeared that the purposes of mat-
rimony had been destroyed to the extent that 
further living together was intolerable, it was in 
acco~dance with the court's duty and prerogative 
to grant plaintiff a divorce. In doing so it is 
desirable to avoid perpetuation of the difficultie3 
that brought failure to the marriage. The object 
to be desired is to minimize animosities and to 
'let the dead past bury its dead' insofar as that 
is possible. The court's responsibility is to en-
deavor to provide a just and equitable adjust-
ment of their economic resources so that the 
parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy 
and useful basis." (Emphasis ours.) 
In Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Ut. 2d 197, 321 P.2d 931, 
this court said : 
''We divine from the record that, as in most 
cases, neither party is without fault, yet there 
appears to be n1uch 1nore good in both of them 
than the other seen1ed willing to credit. It is 
quite probable that in this proceeding under our 
'adversary systmn' which sometilnes in cases of 
domestic strife lends itself 1nore to inflaming 
passions than to pacifying them, considerable 
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anin1us was engendered between the parties, and 
perhaps their counsel, which tended to n1agnify 
and distort the faults each imputed to the other 
out of true perspective for the purpose of 'win-
ning' the case, an objective that neither could 
accomplish in reality because the real prize : the 
harrnony and happiness that might have been 
were forever lost. 
* * * 
"Tennination of the marriage being inevit-
able, the object to be desired was to fashion a 
decree which would be just and equitable under 
the circumstances and, insofar as possible, mini-
mize the animosities which had developed; and to 
provide the best possible basis for the parties 
to reconstruct their lives in a happy and useful 
manner, with primary concern for the welfare 
of their child.'' 
In Curry v. Curry, 7 Ut.2d 198, 321 P.2d 939, appar-
ently the last expression of this court on this subject, it 
is said: 
"There of course must be some objective 
standards upon which to judge whether mental 
cruelty is made out. But it must also be realized 
that what constitutes cruelty to the extent of 
causing great mental distress has considerable 
subjective content because it depends somewhat 
upon the sensibilities of the person complaining, 
and also in a measure upon the justification, or 
lack of it, for the conduct complained of. 
"Being made to feel inferior is ,a galliJng ex-
perience, ,and when persistent, can cre.ate a veri-
table sea of misery. It is plainly evident that 
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because of what the defendant pleases to assun1e 
are his advantages in education and background 
he gave the impression of arrogating to himself 
superiority over the plaintiff and her family; 
and that she and they are of • back woods' charac-
ter. 
"It seems to us but an illusion to suppose that 
we could, by a ukase of this court, remO!Yhd the 
p1artves back into a state. of reconciliation and 
happimess. In reality that would only leave them 
in a state of unhappiness ·and anxiety from wluich, 
as .a practical matter, some other solution would 
be sought anyway. 
"The use of pressur·e .and coercion, either by 
the defendant directly, or by giving him support 
in doing so by ,allowing him t:o have his own way 
completely in this proceeding, would not only be 
highly questionable as a method of accomplish-
ing the: purpose he desires, but in fact may well 
oast the most definite impediment to reconcilia-
tion, or some other worthy solution to the prob-
lems of these parties, that could be .devised. Adult 
personalities usually do not respond to any such 
mandatory tactics. If there is any possibility of 
re-est·ablishment of ,a wholesome family relation-
ship, it could come only through the voluntary 
desires of these parties a"YYAd not through external 
pressures." (Emphasis ours.) 
Both reason and authority support plaintiff's claim 
to a divorce in this case . .At the time of trial the marital 
situation had deteriorated to a point where to continue 
to live as husband and wife would be a crude 1nockery 
of what the marriage relationship is intended to be. The 
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parties are adults, and are 1nature. The plaintiff's de-
cision to seek a divorce was a reasoned one, and was 
arrived at only after extensive professional consultation 
at all levels and frmu all points of view. The children 
of the parties have reached adulthood and do not require 
the sarne parental protection, supervision and control 
as do children of tender years. Both are fully aware of 
the difficulties between the parents, and denial of divorce 
can in no way protect their feelings. All considerations 
of law, equity, justice and common sense, rnilitate in 
favor of granting the plaintiff a divorce. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment below should be reversed and the case 
should be remanded with directions to enter a decree of 
divorce and to n1ake an equitable division of the property 
of the parties, and to award to plaintiff her court costs, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRIST'ENSEN 
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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